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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between civil war and the value of ﬁrms in a poor, resource
abundant country using microeconomic data for Angola. We focus on diamond mining ﬁrms and
conduct an event study on the sudden end of the conﬂict, marked by the death of the rebel movement
leader in 2002. We ﬁnd that the stock market perceived this event as “bad news” rather than “good
news” for companies holding concessions in Angola, as their abnormal returns declined by 4 percentage
points. The event had no eﬀect on a control portfolio of otherwise similar diamond mining companies.
This ﬁnding is corroborated by other events and by the adoption of alternative methodologies. We
interpret our ﬁndings in the light of conﬂict-generated entry barriers, government bargaining power
and transparency in the licensing process.
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Civil wars have come to the forefront of the economic debate due to an increased number of conﬂicts in
recent years and to the dismal economic performance of many countries plagued by internal wars, most
notably in Africa. It is recognized that political instability discourages private investment and that ﬁrms
operating in war-torn economies face increased uncertainty in production and higher operating costs.
Yet many businesses thrive on war, not just the defense industry. Despite being the object of vocal NGO
advocacy and recent UN scrutiny, this point has been overlooked in much of the economic debate. Our
paper is an attempt to provide evidence that under some circumstances violent conﬂict may be perceived
by investors as beneﬁcial, not detrimental, to incumbent ﬁrms.
We focus on the Angolan civil war and on one of the sectors most aﬀected by the war, diamond pro-
duction, to explore investors’ reactions to conﬂict-related events. The Angolan conﬂict is an interesting
case-study for at least two reasons. First, it is a typical “resource war”, as both the government and
the rebel movement ﬁnanced the war by exploiting natural resources (oil and diamonds, respectively).
Secondly, and most relevant from a methodological point of view, the Angolan civil war suddenly ended
with the death of the rebels’ leader, Jonas Savimbi, on February 22, 2002. This allows us to conduct an
event study to assess investors’ reactions to an exogenous conﬂict-related event, and one in which one
party gained an unambiguous victory over the other. Restricting our analysis to the diamond mining
sector is useful because, diﬀerently from oil production sites that are located oﬀshore and were removed
from the ﬁghting in the mainland, the activities of diamond extracting ﬁrms were located in areas very
much at the heart of the conﬂict. A priori, one would therefore expect the (negative) impact of the war
to be maximal for these ﬁrms.
Our main ﬁnding is that the cumulative abnormal returns of “Angolan” stocks experienced a sig-
niﬁcant drop in correspondence to the end of the conﬂict, while those of a control portfolio made of
otherwise similar companies not holding concessions in Angola did not. In other words, international
s t o c km a r k e t sp e r c e i v e dS a v i m b i ’ sd e a t h( a n dl a t e rt h ec e a s e - ﬁre) as “bad news” for the companies oper-
ating in Angola, but not for others. On the event date, the (abnormal) returns of the “Angolan” portfolio
declined by 4 percentage points, and the diﬀerence between “Angolan” and control abnormal returns
was −7 percentage points. This suggests that, no matter how high the costs to be borne by diamond
mining ﬁrms in Angola during the conﬂict, the war appears to have generated some counterbalancing
“beneﬁts” that in the eye of investors more than outweighed these costs. Although our result is based
on a small sample of ﬁrms which were operating in Angola and were also listed on major international
stock exchanges, this is a (sad and) striking result which suggests that much of the received wisdom on
the incentives of the private sector to end conﬂict may need closer scrutiny. We oﬀer a number of inter-
pretations for our ﬁnding, including the fact that during the conﬂict: (i) entry barriers for new diamond
producers were higher; (ii) the bargaining power of Angolan authorities was lower, hence licensing (and
rent seeking) costs for incumbent ﬁrms were lower; and (iii) the lower transparency standards permitted
1by the ongoing war allowed for relatively proﬁtable unoﬃcial dealings.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst is a growing body of political event
studies − e.g. Roberts (1990), Fisman (2001), and Johnson and Mitton (2003) − which examine events
that aﬀected speciﬁc political ﬁgures to estimate their impact on companies that had diﬀerent degrees
of political connections with those ﬁgures. Our analysis diﬀers from these papers because we have no
prior on which companies had links with government or rebel forces and because our goal is not to
quantify the extent of corruption but to understand the consequences of civil conﬂict. Within the event
study approach, the closest work to ours is the paper by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). The authors
compare the per capita GDP in the Basque region with that of a ‘synthetic’ control region that had similar
characteristics at the onset of the conﬂict, and ﬁnd that the Basque region has performed signiﬁcantly
worse after the start of the conﬂict. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that the stocks of ﬁrms with signiﬁcant
business activities in the Basque Country showed a positive response to the cease-ﬁre announced by ETA
in 1998. The main diﬀerence between Abadie and Gardeazabal’s study and ours lies in the economic
environment under consideration. An analysis of the Angolan war (and of many African conﬂicts, as a
matter of fact) requires political economy considerations that may explain a negative stock price response
to peace, rather than a positive one. We think it is important to call attention to this fact, as the existing
empirical evidence on conﬂict and ﬁnancial markets mainly comes from studies on industrialized regions.
Most contemporary conﬂicts occur in poor regions, and the role played by uncertainty in rich, market-
oriented economies is likely to diﬀer from that played in poor, highly regulated countries.
The second branch of literature concerns the role of natural resources in civil wars. This literature,
started by the work of Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998), investigates whether natural resource abundance
increases the likelihood of conﬂict onset, as well as conﬂict duration.1 Our paper has nothing to say
about whether diamond wealth triggered or not civil war in Angola. Our focus is on the eﬀects of war,
rather than on its determinants. However, natural resources come into play because, as we argue, conﬂict
and political instability in resource abundant economies play a diﬀe r e n tr o l et h a ni ti sg e n e r a l l ya s s u m e d ,
due to the particular governance structure that such economies may develop. In an interesting case study
of Angola, Le Billon (2000) argues that narrow and mostly foreign-dominated resource industries, such
as the oil and the diamond sectors, generate huge economic rents that are appropriated by the political
elite. We claim that this is an important element to consider when assessing how the Angolan war was
perceived by investors, and we try to provide empirical evidence in support of this claim.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we brieﬂy sketch the key features of
the Angolan civil conﬂict and the way in which the diamond industry is organized in Angola. Section 2
presents our estimation strategy and data. Section 3 contains our main empirical results, while Section
4o ﬀers additional ﬁndings and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
1For a comprehensive review of these studies, see Ross (2004). Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) investigate the
role of poverty as a determinant of conﬂict onset.
21. Civil war and the diamond industry in Angola
Following its independence from Portugal in 1974, Angola was plagued by a long and cruel civil war
between the Movimento Popular de Liberta¸ cao de Angola (MPLA) and the Uniao Nacional para a
Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). In September 1992, national elections were held and Jos´ e
Eduardo dos Santos, leader of the MPLA, won by a slight margin. This victory was never recognized by
UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi, who initiated a civil war that was perceived by many as driven by his
own desire of political power as much as by ideology. Throughout the war, UNITA’s military strategy
was aimed at occupying the areas of highest concentration of diamond mines and at using diamond
sales to ﬁnance weapons purchases. On the other hand, the MPLA mostly relied on oil for ﬁnancing
its military operations through the Fuerzas Armadas de Angola (FAA), while also earning money from
oﬃcial diamond concessions. As part of the Lusaka Peace Protocol, in 1994 UNITA was given legal
rights to mine and to form partnerships with foreign companies. The peace process collapsed in the
Summer of 1998, however, when the rebels returned to massive attacks against military and civilians.
The years between 1998 and February 2002 marked the last phase of the Angolan conﬂict and constitute
the sample period on which our empirical analysis focuses. During these years, many commentators
talked about a “military stalemate” between governmental and rebel forces. However, on February 22
Jonas Savimbi died in an ambush 100 kilometers from the Zambian border. Six weeks later, on April 4,
the cease-ﬁre had oﬃcially been signed.
Since the beginning of the war, there was a close link between conﬂict and the diamond industry in
Angola. Angolan diamonds have traditionally been mined in alluvial deposits, where capital investments
take the form of light machinery and river diversions, and production was relatively easy to control by
rebel forces. The key role of diamond sales in ﬁnancing UNITA’s operations has brought the problem of
“conﬂict diamonds” to the attention of the public. To give an idea of the importance of the sector, Angola
is the fourth largest diamond producer by value in the world, largely because most of its production is of
gem quality. Angolan diamond sales in 2000 reached $1.1 billion, i.e. 15 percent of the world production
of rough. This amount was almost equally split between oﬃcial industrial production, oﬃcial artisanal
production, and illegal production. It is estimated that between 1992 and 1997, when UNITA controlled
most deposits in the Cuango valley, the rebel movement supplied between 8 and 10 percent by value of
the rough diamonds on the world market (Hodges (2004), pp.174-177).
Diamond production and marketing in Angola has traditionally been controlled by the state-owned
company Endiama through joint ventures. In particular, the diamond law passed in 1994 established
that in order to obtain mining rights, foreign companies must form a partnership with Endiama and with
at least one other Angolan company, and get approval of the Ministry of Geology and Mines. This led to
the proliferation of local mining companies owned by well-connected Angolans, who obtained concession
rights for nominal fees and then sought lucrative partnerships with foreign companies.2 Many army
2Hodges (2004) cites the example of one contract under which “the foreign partner is responsible for all mining activities
3generals also beneﬁted from the situation by establishing private security ﬁrms that were contracted by
the mining company being awarded the concession, sometimes as an implicit part of the deal. These
high hidden costs restricted participation into diamond mining in Angola to a relatively small number
of industrial companies and a large number of artisanal miners (garimpeiros).
Between December 1999 and February 2000, the Angolan diamond industry underwent further re-
structuring. First, the government created a marketing monopoly in which all Angolan diamond produc-
tion would be bought and re-sold by the Angola Selling Corporation (Ascorp). This was a joint venture
between the state-owned Sodiam (51%) and two foreign companies with strong political connections,
Welox and Tais. The creation of Ascorp was perceived as a serious blow to major international compa-
nies operating in Angola, ﬁrst of all to De Beers. Another reform in early 2000 suspended all contracts
that had been signed between Endiama and other mining companies and expropriated prospecting con-
cessions exceeding 3,000 square kilometers. Needless to say, these reforms were not welcomed by existing
companies who saw their contracts unilaterally renegotiated. After the end of the war the situation
has not changed signiﬁcantly. Partnerships with local companies remain a cornerstone of the Angolan
diamond industry, and the government has established a security body that has been seen by many as
an attempt to centralize control of diamond production under domestic intelligence services.
2. Empirical strategy and data
2.1. Methodology
In our event study, we follow the standard methodology presented, among others, by Campbell, Lo and
MacKinlay (1997). We take as a benchmark an augmented market model:
rt = α + βrM
t + θSt + et (1)
where rt is the daily rate of return on a stock, rM
t is the return on the market portfolio, St is a set of
dummies for company-speciﬁc events unrelated to our Angolan political events, and et is an unexplained
residual called the abnormal return. The inclusion of St in the market model ensures that our abnormal
returns do not reﬂect concurrent information released by our companies on earnings, mergers, dividends,
etc.3 Our objective is to study the relationship between the estimated abnormal return et and salient
political events. For each event, we use several event windows (i.e. intervals around the event date
over which markets are likely to have incorporated changing expectations) and estimation windows (i.e.
pre-event days during which model (1) can be estimated). In what follows we shall report results for
symmetric and asymmetric event windows of 0 to 3 days around the date and for an estimation window
and, after deduction of costs and ﬁscal obligations, shares the rest of the production with the Angolan concessionaires on
a 50-50 basis” (ibidem, p.193).
3For each company we retrieved company speciﬁce v e n t sc o n t a i n e di nSt through the Bloomberg database selecting the
following Corporate Action Types: “Corporate Events”, “Capital Change” and “Distributions”.
4of 24 trading days. The relatively short estimation window is due to the high frequency of salient political
events in Angola during the period under consideration. Results with longer estimation windows were
very similar (see Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2004). From the estimated residuals in (1) we generate the
series of cumulative abnormal returns {CARt} as CARt =
Pt
j=t0 ej ,w h e r et0 is the ﬁrst day of the
event window.
We aggregate the cumulative returns for the various companies by constructing two portfolios: an
“Angolan” portfolio constituted by diamond mining companies holding concessions in Angola, and a
“control” portfolio of diamond mining companies that do not have interests in Angola. We use the
control portfolio to make sure that the eﬀects we ﬁnd for “Angolan” companies are not due to shocks
in the market where they trade (and not captured by the market index rM
t ), nor to events aﬀecting the
diamond industry as a whole. The weights assigned to companies in the control are chosen endogenously
so that the resulting portfolio matches as closely as possible three natural properties of the Angolan
portfolio in the period January 2, 1998 - January 31, 2002, i.e. before Savimbi’s death. Speciﬁcally,
our weights minimize the Euclidean distance between two vectors containing: (i) the mean of abnormal
returns; (ii) the variance of abnormal returns; and (iii) the OLS beta of a world market portfolio model
that regresses daily control returns on world market index returns.4 As can be seen in Figure 1, the
tracking between the two portfo l i o si sq u i t es a t i s f a c t o r y , in the sense that returns on the two portfolios
seem to display similar properties. As for the estimated coeﬃcients in (1), the mean (median) beta
for the “Angolan” companies is .49 (.43) and for control companies the corresponding ﬁgures are .45
(.46). For the “Angolan” companies, all the estimated betas are positive and 86% are signiﬁcant at the
5 percent level. For the control group, 95% of the betas are positive and 51% are signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level.
[Insert Figure 1]
We then assess whether a political event has any cumulative impact on our portfolios in two ways.
First, through visual inspection, i.e. plotting CARt over the event window. A downward (upward)
sloping CAR indicates that the event had a negative (positive) impact on stock abnormal returns.
Second, we formally test the null that the event has no impact on CARt through nonparametric rank
and sign tests. We could report statistics based on standard t-tests (as in Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2004)
and results would not change much, but nonparametric tests are much less inﬂuenced by departures from
normality that characterize high frequency data and have better small sample properties.5
4A detailed description of our methodology, which is similar to that of Abadie and Gardezabal (2003), is provided in a
Technical Appendix posted on the web.
5Corrado (1989) shows that even for cross-sectional dimensions below 10 securities nonparametric rank tests have an
approximate Gaussian distribution while classical, parametric tests are signiﬁcantly leptokurtic and display positive skew-
ness. The power properties are far superior to standard tests. Campbell and Wasley (1993) report simulation experiments
in which rank tests have excellent power in medium-sized samples even with less than 10 cross-sectional units. A Technical
Appendix posted on the web provides further details.
5Finally, to compare the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of events on ﬁrm value, we perform an OLS regression
using the full sample daily observations for the period January 2, 1998 - June 28, 2002. We calculate the
abnormal returns ei
t for each of the “Angolan” companies and regress them on a set of dummies that take
value zero in days when nothing occurs and one when a given type of event occurs (see Section 4.4 for an
operational deﬁnition). We use the pooled sample with company ﬁxed eﬀects, clustering the residuals at
the company level. We perform a similar exercise on the pooled sample of companies belonging to our
control portfolio, weighting the individual observations with the (square root of the) estimated control
weights described above.
2.2. Data
We conduct our analysis over the last phase of the conﬂict between UNITA and the MPLA government,
namely the days from January 1st, 1998 to June 28th, 2002. For this period we collected ﬁnancial data
from Datastream and Bloomberg and indicators of political conﬂict from Lexis-Nexis and from several
web sources.6 To construct our Angolan and control portfolios we proceeded in the following way.
For the “Angolan” portfolio we started from the most comprehensive set of diamond mining
companies holding concessions in Angola that we could assemble combining information from the Angolan
Ministry of Mining and Geology, Cilliers and Dietrich (2000) and Global Witness (1998). Considering
that a large number of companies are not publicly traded, the ﬁnal set for which we have price data
o v e rt h ee n t i r es a m p l ep e r i o dc o n s i s t so fs e v e nc o m p a n i e s . 7 Our “Angolan” portfolio is an equally
weighted average of these companies. We work with equally weighted returns because the companies
under consideration have substantially diﬀerent sizes and a more traditional value-weighted approach
would essentially limit the analysis to De Beers, or to one or two additional companies at most. On the
contrary, we are interested in detecting eﬀects that are likely to have aﬀected stock prices of all mining
companies operating in Angola, presumably in homogeneous directions. Nonetheless, given the atypical
position of De Beers compared to other players, we have replicated our results excluding De Beers from
the Angolan portfolio, without noticing substantial qualitative changes.
6In Lexis-Nexis we performed a search in the category ‘World News’ from the news source ‘Middle-East and Africa’,
using the following keywords: UNITA, FAA, Savimbi, rebels, and diamond(s). We also did a focused search on the
same database including the term Angola together with (alternatively): deaths, dead, killed, wounded, injured, at-
tack(s), victims, strike(s). We then complemented the search with web sources, including the Angola Peace Monitor
by Action for Southern Africa (http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/), the Integrated Regional Information Networks Africa
(http://www.irinnews.org), the UN Oﬃce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aﬀairs (http://www.reliefweb.int), and
War News (http://www.warnews.it/ita/angola.html).
7These are: American Mineral Fields Inc (TSX), Ashton Mining Ltd (ASX), Caledonia Mining Corporation (TSX), De
Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (JSE), Diamondworks Ltd (TSX), SouthernEra Resources Ltd (TSX), Trans Hex Group
Ltd (JSE), where TSX, ASX and JSE stand —respectively— for Toronto, Australia, and Johannseburg Stock Exchange.
Two of these companies changed denomination during our sample period: Ashton Mining (Rio Tinto Plc) and De Beers
Consolidated Mines (Anglo American). We dummied out these events and used the new series afterwards.
6Our control portfolio is a weighted average of diamond mining companies that satisfy all the
following criteria during our sample period: (a) to be listed in one of the markets where the “Angolan”
companies are traded (i.e. Sydney, Johannesburg, Toronto); (b) to be continuously traded over the
sample period; and (c) do not hold exploration or mining concessions in Angola. Criterion (a) is intended
to lend plausibility to the assumption that the diﬀerence between the abnormal returns of Angolan and
control companies may indeed be related to political events in Angola. To this purpose, our residuals
are estimated conditioning on the same underlying common factors, chieﬂy the corresponding national
stock market indices. Criterion (b) limits the analysis to a sample in which bankruptcy or listing events
have no inﬂuence. As for criterion (c), it simply qualiﬁes a company as belonging to the control sample.
These three criteria leave us with a subset of 42 companies. The list of companies and their weights in
the control portfolio are reported in an Appendix posted on the web.
3. Results
3.1. Savimbi’s death
The natural starting point for our event study is the end of the conﬂict, as marked by Jonas Savimbi’s
death on February 22, 2002. While one can identify several other conﬂict episodes (e.g., particularly
severe attacks by the government or by the rebels), on a priori grounds it would be diﬃcult to know
whether a given episode was perceived as an increase or a decrease in the likelihood of conﬂict resolution,
and by how much. On the contrary, both the sign and the magnitude of the impact of Savimbi’s death
on the probability that the war would end are known with certainty. In fact, the rebel leader’s death was
unanimously perceived as the ending point of the conﬂict because Savimbi’s personality, with its military
and political acumen and its ambition for power, was seen as the key obstacle to the peace process.8
Indeed, one and a half months after Savimbi’s death, a formal cease-ﬁre had already been signed putting
an end to the Angolan conﬂict.
[Insert Figure 2]
Figure 2 contains our main result. It shows the evolution over time of the abnormal return (AR)
and of the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the “Angolan” portfolio (top panel) and for the
control portfolio (bottom panel) during the four trading days around Savimbi’s death. The event date
is indicated by a vertical line. Quite strikingly, for “Angolan” companies on average we do not observe
an increase in cumulative abnormal returns, but rather a sizeable decrease leading to negative values.
On February 22, our Angolan portfolio lost 4 percentage points. The evolution of the abnormal returns
8To quote one source among many, “(Savimbi) embarked on a 27-year long quest for power which eventually took on
the character of an obsession. (...) UNITA’s military power was progressively weakened (...). For a brilliant tactician, there
was no way out. The only option left was peace on the government’s terms and a role for himself as a private citizen. It
was not one he was prepared to consider” (Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, May 2002, pp.13-14).
7shows that the shock was gradually absorbed over the following three trading days. It is noteworthy,
though, that the abnormal returns remained consistently negative during that period. As a result, three
days after Savimbi’s death the CAR of the “Angolan” portfolio had declined by 7 percentage points in
excess of what was justiﬁed by the underlying market dynamics. On the contrary, in the bottom panel
of Figure 2 we see that the abnormal return of the control portfolio was +1.4 percentage points on the
event date and subsequently became negative and then positive again. The overall eﬀect on the CAR
of the control portfolio after three days was an increase of over 4 percentage points. Notice that if the
negative eﬀect on the Angolan portfolio were the result of an extraneous event aﬀecting the diamond
industry or the stock markets where the companies are traded, we should have observed a similar trend
in the CAR of the control portfolio, which is not the case. If we interpret the opposite sign in the
trend of the CAR of the control portfolio as the result of unobserved factors that (positively) aﬀect the
whole diamond industry, the magnitude of our eﬀect actually increases: on the event date the diﬀerence
between the CAR of the “Angolan” portfolio and of its counterfactual is −5 percent. Alternatively,
the increase in the abnormal returns of the control portfolio may be caused by the Angolan event if
investors switched out of “Angolan” stocks in favor of (similar) competing stocks. In either case, our
main ﬁnding is that investors perceived Savimbi’s death as “bad news” for the companies holding mining
concessions in Angola, and as “no news” or “good news” for otherwise similar companies not operating
in the country.
[Insert Table 1]
In Table 1 we formally test whether the eﬀects displayed in the graphs are statistically signiﬁcant.
Speciﬁcally, the table reports the results of the nonparametric tests of the null that the CAR of the
Angolan (control) portfolio is zero in correspondence to the event, both against the alternative that it
is diﬀerent from zero and against the alternative that it is negative (positive). In the last two columns
of the table we test the null that the diﬀerence between the CAR of the control portfolio and that of
the Angolan one is zero against the null that it is positive. In the top part of the table we construct
our test statistics using abnormal returns, while in the bottom part we employ raw returns to show that
our eﬀects are not driven by movements in the market index. Each row in the Table corresponds to a
diﬀerent event window, and we report results for a short asymmetric window (-0,+1) and for a longer
symmetric one (-3,+3). For the Angolan portfolio, all the tests reject the null against the alternative
of a negative eﬀect at the 5 percent level, with one exception at the 10 percent level. For the control
portfolio, the results point either to an insigniﬁcant or to a positive reaction. Anyway in all cases the
diﬀerence between the two portfolios is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
To corroborate our ﬁnding, we look inside the Angolan portfolio to see if companies with greater
involvement in Angola were particularly hit by the event. For this purpose we collected a breakdown of
each company’s assets and we constructed the variable AssetShare, equal to the ratio of assets located
in Angola over total company assets at the time of Savimbi’s death. If we compute the abnormal return
8of individual companies, ARi, on February 22 and regress it on the asset share variable, we obtain the
following:
ARi = −.01 −.24∗∗ AssetSharei
(.015) (.088)
where numbers in parenthesis are standard errors and the adjusted R2 is .52. To check for the possibility
that this may be a spurious relationship, we conducted a “placebo” experiment by randomly selecting
ﬁfty non-event days and running the same regression.9 None of the coeﬃcients of the AssetShare variable
was signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Although these estimates should be taken with caution due to the
small number of observations, they do suggest that the reaction of stock prices to Savimbi’s death had
to do with the companies’ involvement in Angola.
3.2. Can war be good for incumbent companies?
How can we explain the apparently paradoxical reaction of investors to the end of the conﬂict? Our
interpretation is that the positive eﬀects of the resolution of uncertainty were counterbalanced by the
expectation that the newly acquired stability of the government would shrink the proﬁt margins of the
companies already holding concessions. This could occur for several reasons.
The ﬁrst, and most obvious, is an increase in the competition faced by incumbent ﬁrms due to
the potential entry of new ﬁrms. The presence of a civil war limits participation in the private sector
to ﬁrms that can work in high risk environments. This involves a number of aspects, including the
willingness/ability to contract private security ﬁrms and strike deals with local armed forces, as well as
the capability to sustain increased production costs due to the fact that road transportation becomes
insecure and supplies may have to be brought in by air. One could therefore conceive that after the end
of the war many more companies could aﬀord or be willing to enter the Angolan mining sector, and this
would limit the prospects for incumbents in acquiring new concessions. Judging from what happened
ex post, this may not have been the sole explanation. Industry sources suggest that between February
2002 and today most incumbents reinforced, if anything, their position in the Angolan mining sector.10
However, even if there was no turnover in those holding concessions, the potential entry of other ﬁrms
9These ﬁfty dates were randomly drawn from the full sample after excluding days in which salient events related to the
conﬂict or to diamond mining in Angola occurred. In particular, the dates excluded are the same used for the construction
of event-type dummies in section 4.4 below.
10During 2002, Endiama established a joint venture with SouthernEra (in our portfolio) and the Israeli-owned Welox
to develop the Camafuca kimberlite pipe. As for later years, according to a Mining Annual Review 2004 article by Paul
Crankshaw, the three projects in which new production was to be expected were in Fucauma-Luarica, Alto Cuilo, and
on the Chicapa River. The foreign partners in these projects were, respectively: TransHex, Petra Diamonds, and Alrosa,
and all three were already present in Angola throughout our sample period. Overall, the largest player in the market was
and remains an Israeli diamantaire, Lev Leviev, who already in 2000 had acquired the right to market the entire Angolan
production through Ascorp.
9is likely to have shrunk the proﬁt margins of incumbents. Note that the role of war as a barrier to entry
is not speciﬁc to Angola nor to the diamond sector.11
A second explanation has to do with the extent of government control over the mining sector, and
its eﬀect on regulation and rent seeking behavior. The concession of mining rights has traditionally
been one of the chief forms of patronage for the Angolan government, as described in Section 1. The
conﬂict with UNITA eﬀectively thwarted the monopoly of the government over mining rights, as rebel
forces controlled part of the diamond-rich territory. In the mid-1990s the UNITA company Sociedade
General Mineiro (SGM) had legal mining rights and could form partnerships with foreign companies,
auctioning its own licenses. In the last phase of the conﬂict, mining by UNITA had been declared illegal
but underground activities were still known to occur. As late as October 2001, a UN expert panel
was writing that “many of the diamond companies have a previous history of working with UNITA
and the Mechanism has information that some companies continue to do so. However, direct proof of
working with UNITA is extremely diﬃcult to ﬁnd” (UN Monitoring Mechanism report, October 2001,
§ 186). Once the “competitive force” of armed conﬂict disappeared, the management of the diamond
industry became more centralized and fears of increased rent extraction likely prevailed in the mind of
investors. It should be recalled that right after the signing of the Lusaka Peace Protocol in 1994 the
government, expecting a bust in foreign investment, had tightened regulation in the diamond sector. An
explicit quote along these lines comes from the Economist Intelligence Unit: “The end of the war will
undoubtedly open up new areas to exploitation by foreign and Angolan mining companies. However,
most foreign companies are wary of conditions in Angola following years of contract-breaking by the
Angolan authorities” (EUI Country Report, May 2002, p. 27). A synthetic quote from a local source is
possibly more explicit: “the end of the war in Angola means that right now the main institution in the
country is corruption.”12 Again, the relationship between conﬂict, lack of government monopoly over
natural resources, and regulation is not unique to the Angolan case.
Related to the above argument is a third explanation that has the ﬂavor of a price war between
the government and UNITA over the concession of mining rights. The length of the conﬂict, and the
withdrawal of the external funding that had helped both sides during the Cold War, put increasing
pressure on the two parties to obtain immediate revenue. This is likely to have shifted bargaining power
in favor of ﬁrms and allowed them to strike better deals. This was particularly true in the case of UNITA
after the imposition of UN sanctions that rendered dealing with rebel forces illegal and forced the latter
to do business on terms very favorable to the buyers. Indeed, industry sources suggest that working
11To quote one reference on Congo, “Mining companies are condemned to operating wherever they ﬁnd minerals. They
can consequently ﬁnd themselves in the middle of conﬂicts that have erupted around them. In some instances they also
deliberately enter conﬂict zones as part of a high risk-high proﬁt strategy to exploit areas lacking competitors, or to gain
a toehold before competitors arrive.” (Oxford Analytica, Congo-Kinshasa: Resource sector brings political risks,2 0J u l y
2005).
12Quote by Rafael Marques, a dissident journalist from Luanda. Reported by Tim Butcher in “As guerrilla war ends,
corruption now bleeds Angola to death”, www.telegraph.co.uk, 30 July 2002.
10under UNITA protection was a particularly cheap way to extract diamonds: “according to one former
garimpeiro who worked in the twilight zone between UNITA and government control, foreign dealers paid
$250 to UNITA for prospecting rights” (Pearce (2004), p. 4). The end of the war would dramatically
decrease the demand for weapons (and for immediate revenue) by the two parties and thus increase ﬁrms’
licensing costs. Through this channel, company proﬁts would have decreased after Savimbi’s death even
if the extent of regulation and rent extraction by the government had not changed.
Finally, during the war the lack of transparency in the management of the resource sector allowed
public oﬃcials and well connected companies to collude in extracting surplus at the expense of the
citizens. Despite repeated attempts to denounce this system, the delay in reforming the country’s
institutions was typically blamed on the state of emergency created by the ongoing conﬂict. Investors
may thus have expected that, after the end of the war, the government would have faced increasing
pressure to make the licensing system more transparent, and this could have turned to the disadvantage
of some incumbent ﬁrms. Indeed, after the end of the war the Angolan government endorsed the
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative and is currently considering its implementation.
Overall, the above explanations are all consistent with our ﬁndings, and certainly should not be
considered mutually exclusive. Unfortunately, it is impossible to quantify the contribution of each
channel to the estimated eﬀect due to the intrinsic non-veriﬁability of UNITA’s dealings with individual
companies and to the lack of disclosure of licensing fees on both sides. In what follows, we provide further
empirical results to test the robustness of our ﬁndings and to rule out some alternative interpretations.
4. Robustness
4.1. Involvement in conﬂict zones
Given that the above explanations hinge on the peculiar nature of production activities in “conﬂict
economies”, further insights can be obtained by considering the involvement of the diﬀerent companies
in other conﬂict zones. Together with Angola, Sierra Leonea n d—t oal e s s e re x t e n t—t h eD e m o c r a t i c
Republic of Congo (DRC) are the countries in which illicit diamond mining has most contributed to
ﬁnancing civil war. Contemporaneous presence in at least two of these countries could then be interpreted
as a signal that a company has a “comparative advantage” in a conﬂict environment. This feature would
have two opposite eﬀects in our event study: on the one hand, companies that specialize in conﬂict areas
should have been the ones most negatively aﬀected by Savimbi’s death. On the other hand, presence in
Sierra Leone or the DRC might have allowed the same companies to diversify into similar environments
and thus better cushion the eﬀects of the Angolan event.
Luckily for us, the conﬂict in Sierra Leone ended one month before Savimbi’s death, as disarmament
was declared oﬃcially complete on January 17, 2002. The DRC, however, was still a theatre of widespread
conﬂict at the time of Savimbi’s death. We can therefore create smaller portfolios of Angolan companies
and perform two exercises in which we have unambiguous predictions on the relative size of the eﬀect.
11The ﬁrst is a comparison among companies active in Angola and Sierra Leone, but not in the DRC, and
the other remaining companies. We expect the former to be the ones taking the biggest hit in response
to the news. In fact, with the situation in Sierra Leone evolving towards normality, the end of the war
in Angola meant further reductions in the gains from “conﬂict operations” and no ongoing activity in
other conﬂict environments. The second exercise is a comparison between companies working in Angola
and DRC, and the remaining companies.13 In this case we have no prior on the relative magnitude of the
eﬀect because of the two contrasting forces mentioned above. The results of these exercises are displayed
in Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3]
The bars of the histogram indicate the abnormal returns of the various sub-portfolios on the day of
Savimbi’s death. The estimate for the single day event window is −4.9 percentage points for companies
working in Angola and Sierra Leone and −3.2 for the remaining ones.14 Thus, our conjecture ﬁnds
support in the data: the end of the Angolan conﬂict was bad news for both portfolios, but more so for
the companies that also had concessions in what no longer was a conﬂict zone. On the other hand, the
abnormal return for companies operating in Angola and DRC was −1.9 percentage points, compared to
−4.4 for the remaining portfolio, suggesting that —if joint presence in more conﬂict areas was a signal of
comparative advantage— holding concessions in areas were conﬂict was not yet over might have allowed
companies to diversify their operations.
4.2. Corruption
Evidence that the management of government licenses was not perceived as particularly beneﬁcial to
foreign diamond companies can be obtained by looking at an earlier event: the unexpected suspension of
Endiama’s managing director, Jose Dias, on allegations of corruption mandated by the vice-minister of
geology and mines on January 26, 1999. In correspondence to this event the abnormal returns of Angolan
stocks were positive, 2 percent, while those of the control portfolio were -1 percent. In other words, this
anti-corruption episode was perceived as good news for the mining companies directly interested by it,
but not for other companies.
13Note that none of the companies in our sample was active in all three countries at the same time: two companies had
concessions in Angola and Sierra Leone and two in Angola and DRC.
14Similarly, the standardized rank of a portfolio that invests in companies involved in both Sierra Leone and Angola is
-2.33, vs. -1.01 for a portfolio of companies operating in Angola only. We also apply a nonparametric rank test to the
cumulative abnormal returns of a portfolio that invests (with equal weights) a dollar in Angolan companies not involved
in Sierra Leone, plus the proceedings from shorting (for another dollar) the portfolio composed of companies also active in
Sierra Leone, for a total net investment of one dollar. The corresponding rank statistic is 1.44 for the (0,+1) event window,
implying a rejection of the null of symmetric eﬀect with a (one-tail) p-value of 0.074.
124.3. Alternative interpretations
A possible interpretation of our main result is that Savimbi’s death might have increased the uncertainty
o v e rt h ee n do ft h ec o n ﬂict, rather than decreased it, for example because there was no clear successor
to UNITA’s leadership. To rule out this interpretation we conduct an event study corresponding to the
“oﬃcial” end of the war, namely, the signing of a cease-ﬁre agreement between the FAA and UNITA on
April 4, 2002. The results are shown in Figure 4 and are very similar to those obtained for Savimbi’s
death.
[Insert Figure 4]
On the day of the cease-ﬁre, the abnormal return on the Angolan portfolio was -4 percent. If we take
March 30 — the day in which the cease-ﬁre memorandum was presented — as the starting date of our
event window, the cumulative abnormal return on April 4 was -9 percent. On the contrary, the control
portfolio displays a weakly positive reaction to the signing of the cease-ﬁre, as shown in the bottom panel
of Figure 4. Nonparametric tests (unreported) indicate that the eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcant for the
Angolan portfolio and insigniﬁcant for the control one. We can therefore conclude that the unambiguous
end of the war was still bad news for diamond mining companies working in Angola.
Another interpretation is that peace might have damaged mining ﬁrms by causing a fall in diamond
prices if Angola had decided to boost its production and ﬂood the international market. We can rule
out this explanation on three grounds. First, being a generalized eﬀect on diamond prices, this should
have aﬀected ﬁrms in the control portfolio too. Second, if one looks at the evolution of diamond prices
through 2003, they did not respond to the changed situation in Angola. Finally, the company that was
threatened the most by the potential price eﬀect was De Beers. However, when we exclude De Beers from
the Angolan portfolio and re-estimate the weights for the control portfolio, the results remain virtually
unchanged: the only diﬀerence is a slight increase in the size of the eﬀect.15
4.4. How diﬀerent types of events aﬀect ﬁrm value
In addition to the above results on the end of the war, we conducted a more systematic analysis to
take into account other conﬂict-related events and episodes of tightening in industry regulation. The
relevant events were selected through the Lexis-Nexis search described in Section 3. On the basis of the
number of casualties and/or of the relevance given to each episode by the media, we selected 19 events
that we grouped under six categories: end of conﬂict, government victories over UNITA, UNITA attacks
on civilians, UNITA attacks on industrial diamond mines, UNITA attacks on garimpeiros (artisanal
miners), and tightened industry regulation. A detailed list of events can be found in Guidolin and La
15Detailed tests concerning these alternative interpretations are reported in the working paper version, Guidolin and La
Ferrara (2004).
13Ferrara (2004). We then regressed the daily abnormal returns of our “Angolan” and control companies
on six dummies corresponding to the above categories of events. The results are reported in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2]
The ﬁrst and most notable result is that, in correspondence to the “end of the conﬂict”, the abnor-
mal returns of “Angolan” companies decreased by 3 percentage points, and this eﬀect was statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. This estimate is fairly close to the 4 percentage point decrease that
we obtained in our event study (Section 3.1), the diﬀerence being due to the fact that the residual ei,t
was estimated on the full sample here, and on a shorter pre-event window before. The coeﬃcient for
the companies in our control portfolio, on the other hand, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
hypothesis that the diﬀerence between the two coeﬃcients is zero is rejected at the 1 percent level. When
we turn to attacks and military victories that occurred during the course of the conﬂict (“Government
victories” and “UNITA attacks on civilians”) we do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the two sets of coeﬃcients, possibly because the protracted nature of these episodes is not well captured
by one-day dummies, or because identifying the most salient episodes over the course of four years of in-
tense ﬁghting is not an uncontroversial task. UNITA attacks on industrial mines have instead a negative
impact on “Angolan” companies and a positive eﬀect on control companies, the diﬀerence being signiﬁ-
cant at the 5 percent level. The positive eﬀect on our control portfolio can be due either to unobserved
events aﬀecting the whole diamond industry, or to the resulting competitive advantage of “non-Angolan”
companies. In fact following an attack on an industrial mine rational investors may want to switch out
of Angolan stocks that have become rebel targets in favor of similar non-Angolan companies. Attacks
on unorganized artisanal miners (garimpeiros) had no impact on either group of companies. Finally, the
dummy “Industry regulation” identiﬁes episodes in which the Angolan government tightened its control
on the diamond sector by centralizing the marketing process and imposing stricter regulation on joint
ventures. These interventions had a negative and signiﬁcant impact on the abnormal returns of our
“Angolan” companies, corroborating the argument that investors did not perceive the management of
the diamond industry by the Angolan government as particularly favorable to foreign companies. The
eﬀect on companies belonging to the control portfolio is not statistically signiﬁcant, nor is the diﬀerence
among the coeﬃcients.
4.5. Matched pairs
A typical control design in the event study literature consists of matching each of the “target” companies
to one control company, and investigating whether the event under consideration has a signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent impact on their abnormal returns. To explore the robustness of our results to this alternative
way of constructing the control group, we proceed in the following way. For each of the seven “Angolan”
companies, we select out of the available 42 companies a matched control using two criteria: (a) the
control has to be listed in the same stock exchange (this to net out the eﬀect of the market index
14factor and of other common macroeconomic inﬂuences); and (b) the control has to be of the closest
possible size, as measured by total assets in US dollars, vs. the Angolan company. We thus formed 7
pairs and proceeded to apply non-parametric tests concerning mean abnormal returns in correspondence
to Savimbi’s death, as well as Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the null that the mean for the Angolan
company exceeds the mean of the matched control.16 The results were broadly consistent with our
previous approach. Focussing for instance on the (-0,+1) event window, in ﬁve cases out of seven we
ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in mean are signiﬁcantly lower for “Angolan” companies than for the matched
control (with p-values below 0.10; the p-values are actually below 0.05 in four cases). One of the two
remaining pairs reveals no signiﬁcant diﬀerence, and the other has a positive signed-rank statistic.
4.6. Statistical issues
We also performed a number of robustness checks to make sure that our results continue to hold under
diﬀerent statistical methodologies. First, our ﬁndings do not depend on the choice of the underlying
model for expected returns. When we estimate abnormal returns from a multi-factor model that includes
a world market index among the regressors, our results are basically unchanged.17 Additionally, Table
1a l s op r e s e n t sr e s u l t sb a s e do nraw returns — i.e. when for simplicity expected returns are set to zero
and we prevent the choice of the expected return model to aﬀect our results — and ﬁnds that results are
essentially unchanged.
Second, in constructing the control portfolio we experimented with alternative weighting matrices to
aggregate means, variances and betas that are measured in diﬀerent units. In addition to the weighting
matrix proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), which we employed for the results reported in this
paper, we also used a diagonal matrix containing the inverse of the (asymptotic) standard deviations of
the maximum likelihood estimators of the mean, the variance, and the market model beta. The results
were very similar and can be found in Guidolin and La Ferrara (2004).
Third, we performed afresh our nonparametric rank and sign tests concerning the stock price reaction
to Savimbi’s death for estimation windows of 63 days and for a variety of symmetric and asymmetric
event windows. Results were largely unchanged relative to Table 1.
Fourth, one may be concerned that — because a majority of the companies in our samples are small
capitalization ﬁrms listed in stock exchanges outside the US — our event studies results might be plagued
by thin trading-induced biases. As ﬁrst recognized by Heinkel and Kraus (1988), thin trading — in
the form of a high proportion of days with no change in closing prices and therefore artiﬁcially zero
(raw) returns — may bias test statistics in favor of rejecting the null of no event-related impact by
16The pairs are as follows: American Mineral Fields-Tahera; Ashton-BHP Billiton; Caledonia-REX Diamond Mining; De
Beers-African Gems Resources; Diamondworks-Golden Star Resources; Southernera-Etruscan Resources; Transhex-Thabex
Exploration.
17The variable used is the MSCI total value-weighted World Index. All the results commented here are reported in
Guidolin and La Ferrara (2004).
15artiﬁcially reducing the standard deviations of returns and related statistics. The worst possible case
would correspond to the existence of a structural diﬀerence between the impact of thin trading for our
“Angolan” vs. control samples, in the sense of a stronger eﬀect on the former portfolio. This is not the
case in our data: over the entire sample, the incidence of days with zero raw returns is 19% for companies
in the “Angolan” portfolio vs. 39% for our controls. If we use the 20% threshold employed among others
by Maynes and Rumsey (1993), i.e. stocks with less than 20% incidence of zero raw returns are ‘thickly’
traded, our Angolan sample is (borderline-) free of strong thin trading issues, and the problem seems to
mostly concern the average control company. Therefore, if anything, our tests on the diﬀerences between
means would be biased against rejecting the null.18
Having said this, we re-run our event study of Savimbi’s death adjusting daily returns to formally
take into account the presence of thin trading, as suggested in the literature. In particular, instead of
“lumping” returns in correspondence to dates in which a price change is recorded, we proceed to either
“splice” realized returns over periods between successive tradings, or to compute trade-to-trade returns
and drop all dates in which no trading activity is recorded.19 In the former case (uniform returns), with
reference to abnormal returns on the “Angolan” portfolio, we ﬁnd rank statistics of -2.30 and -1.63 for
windows of (-0,+1) and (-3,+3), respectively. The sign tests take instead values of -2.38 and -4.86. In
the latter case, when trade-to-trade returns are employed, the rank statistics are -2.02 and -1.60 and
the sign statistics are -2.01 and -3.02. Clearly all of these statistics imply (one-sided) p-values of 0.05 or
less. Similarly, non-parametric tests of a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in mean returns between “Angolan” and
control portfolio yield p-values of 0.05 or less.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has examined the relationship between civil war and the value of ﬁrms in a poor, resource
abundant economy. We focus on the diamond sector in Angola and estimate stock returns for a sample
of mining companies holding concessions in the country, and for a control portfolio of otherwise similar
companies not operating in Angola. Using an event study approach, we ﬁnd that the end of the conﬂict, as
represented by the death of the rebel leader and by the oﬃcial cease-ﬁre, decreased rather than increased
the abnormal returns of the “Angolan” portfolio. This eﬀect is sizeable and statistically signiﬁcant, and
is not likely to arise from unmeasured shocks to the diamond industry occurring at the same time, as the
18If we limit our attention to the periods from which the daily returns used in our event studies are drawn (estimation
windows), instead of the full sample, the corresponding statistics are basically unchanged: 20 and 39 percent for “Angolan”
and control companies, respectively. To obtain these incidence statistics we averaged individual company data, applying
equal weights in the case of “Angolan” companies, and the same weights of the control portfolio for the other companies.
Equivalently, these statistics correspond to an average number of days between trades of 1.3 and 1.6, respectively.
19In the case of tests based on trade-to-trade returns, a longer estimation window of 63 days was employed, as computation
of trade-to-trade returns implies loss of observations. A Technical Appendix posted on the web provides details on the two
methods.
16“counterfactual” constituted by our control portfolio shows no signiﬁcant reaction. In related research
using a continuous indicator of tension we show that moderate levels of conﬂict can be beneﬁcial to
private ﬁrms, while extremely low or high levels of tension reduce their abnormal returns (see Guidolin
and La Ferrara, 2004).
We interpret our results in the light of the beneﬁts that some incumbent ﬁrms may derive from a
conﬂict environment in resource dependent economies such as Angola. The occupation of parts of the
territory by the rebels and the instability created by civil war may constitute a barrier to entry, reduce
the government’s bargaining power, and facilitate non-transparent licensing schemes. A cynical reader
of our results may consider the popular street saying during the 1992 presidential elections in Angola —
“The MPLA steals, UNITA kills” — and say that our ﬁndings cast doubt on whether private investors
perceived killing to be worse than stealing. We understand that our ﬁndings are based on a small sample
of ﬁrms and that they may be speciﬁc to the African context, though not solely to Angola. In this
sense, they should not be viewed as in opposition to previous studies that found conﬂict to negatively
aﬀect ﬁrm value in industrialized countries. This paper does suggest, however, that in the debate on
whether or how growth of the mining industry in Africa can bring widespread beneﬁts to its population,
one should acknowledge a simple fact: to the extent that some incumbent ﬁrms may beneﬁtf r o mc i v i l
war, this may aﬀect their incentives to exert political and economic pressure to prevent or stop ongoing
conﬂicts.
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Figure 1: Angolan and Control Portfolio 

















































Figure 2: Savimbi’s death 
 






























Figure 3: Involvement in conflict zones 
 
 
















































(b)     Control portfolio 
 
 
Figure 4: Cease fire 
 Table 1: Testing the impact of Savimbi's death
Difference*
Event Rank p-value p-value Sign p-value p-value Rank p-value p-value Sign p-value p-value Rank p-value
window statistic Two-tailed One-tailed statistic Two-tailed One-tailed statistic Two-tailed One-tailed statistic Two-tailed One-tailed statistic One-tailed
Abnormal returns
(-0,+1) -3.065 0.002 0.001 -1.414 0.157 0.079 1.300 0.194 0.097 2.000 0.046 0.023 -1.715 0.043
(-3,+3) -2.430 0.015 0.008 -6.584 0.000 0.000 0.444 0.657 0.329 3.000 0.003 0.001 -3.050 0.001
Raw returns
(-0,+1) -2.020 0.043 0.022 -2.554 0.011 0.005 0.390 0.696 0.348 3.000 0.003 0.001 -1.754 0.040
(-3,+3) -2.711 0.007 0.003 -2.000 0.046 0.023 0.024 0.981 0.490 1.000 0.317 0.159 -3.142 0.001
* Test of the null that the "Control" mean minus the "Angolan" mean is zero, against the alternative that it is positive.
ANGOLAN portfolio CONTROL portfolioTable 2: Abnormal returns and different types of events
ANGOLAN CONTROL Test  βA-βC = 0
βA βC (p-value)
End of conflict -.03** .004 0.001
(.009) (.003)
Government victories .014 .042** 0.1
(.012) (.012)
UNITA attacks civilians .019 -.0001 0.28
(.017) (.004)
UNITA attacks mines -.028 .013** 0.03
(.017) (.005)
UNITA attacks garimpeiros -.014 .009 0.15
(.014) (.005)
Industry regulation -.01** -.013 0.82
(.004) (.010)
Company fixed effects Yes Yes
Notes:
Table reports estimated OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis are corrected for heteroskedasticity
and clustering of the residuals at the company level.  N = 55,155.
* denotes significance at the 5 percent level, ** at the 1 percent level.
Last column reports p-value of the test for the difference of the coefficients against two-sided alternative.Technical Appendix to
Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not.
Is Conﬂict Bad for Private Firms?
September 2006
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide some technical details which complement the analysis
presented in the September 2006 version of our paper.
1. Hypothesis Testing in Event Studies
1.1. Baseline Setup
Suppose to have time series data {rit}T
t=1 on daily stock returns for n companies, i =1 ,...,n.Call τ the
length of the ﬁxed estimation window. Denote as t0 −k the ﬁrst day of the chosen event window, where
t0 is the event date. We estimate some model for stock returns on the sample that goes from t0 − k − τ
to t0−k−1. We use the estimated parameters (say, b αi,b βi and b θi) to obtain the series of ﬁtted abnormal
returns and its variance over the estimation window and calculate residuals, i.e.:
eit = rit − b αi − b βirM








it i =1 ,...,n.








ij ≡ rij − b αi − b βirM
j −b θiSij j = t0 − k,t0 − k +1 ,...,t 0 + k,
where i =1 ,...,n refers to the individual companies. After performing this analysis for each company








1In vector notation, e∗
i and CAR are (k +1)×1a n dn×1 vectors of company-speciﬁc abnormal returns
and cumulative abnormal returns, respectively.
1.2. Parametric Gaussian Tests
In the earlier version of the paper, i.e. Guidolin and La Ferrara (2004), we followed the traditional event
study literature and used the parametric Gaussian tests presented in Campbell et al. (1997) to test
hypotheses concerning average eﬀects across portfolios. Underlying the validity of that approach is the
assumption that returns are drawn from an independently, identically distributed multivariate normal
distribution. A thorough reading of the more recent ﬁnancial econometrics literature has made us aware
of the following issues.
1. Asset returns are massively heteroskedastic, especially at relatively high frequencies such as with
daily data. This violates the i.i.d. assumption.
2. Asset returns are non-normal, even when account is taken of the presence of heteroskedasticity.
3. Even if the original return data were truly multivariate Gaussian i.i.d., the clustering of events (i.e.
more than one asset is aﬀected by an event at the same time) is likely to generate cross-correlation
and heteroskedastic eﬀects in panel data sets, i.e. when more than one asset is under investigation.
As discussed by Bernard (1987) and Campbell and Wasley (1993), clustering causes issues that
are formally diﬀerent from non-normalities: clustering violates the i.i.d assumption that support
classical tests. The eﬀects of clustering are important only when k ≥ 1, i.e. the event study spans
an event window that exceeds the day.
4 .T h ea n a l y s i si so f t e np e r f o r m e dw i t hl i m i t e dc r oss-sections and short estimation windows, which
prevents a researcher from invoking asymptotic results concerning the limiting distribution of
the test statistics. Brown and Warner (1985), Corrado (1989), Corrado and Zivney (1992) report
disappointing results on the small sample properties of Gaussian based parametric tests when τ and
n are both small. In particular t-tests appear to severely overreject the null of no eﬀect as a result
of leptokurtic and right-skewed small-sample distributions of the test statistic in experiments with
n = 5 and 10, and with τ = 39 observations. Campbell and Wasley (1993) work with infrequently
traded NASDAQ stocks and ﬁnd that even with n =2 5a n dτ = 250, the distribution of the equally
weighted abnormal returns substantially deviates from normality.
Given that the above problems would undermine the validity of our earlier tests, we decided to
implement nonparametric tests in the new version of the paper.
1.3. Nonparametric Tests
Corrado (1989) proposes a useful nonparametric test derived as an adaptation of Wilcoxon two-sample
rank test that applies to general multivariate distributions for abnormal returns, including asymmet-
ric, fat-tailed and multimodal ones, i.e. the typical non-Gaussian cases encountered in high frequency
2ﬁnancial data. Furthermore, Brown and Warner (1985) and Corrado and Zivney (1992) show that
nonparametric rank tests are much less inﬂuenced by event-induced heteroskedasticity (i.e. variance
changes) than their parametric counterparts. Chandra et al. (1995) show that rank tests perform on
average the best across all tests, i.e. they are approximately independent of the underlying and unknown
model for the true change in the mean of abnormal returns. Finally, rank tests take care not only of
departures from normality (since they do not rely on it), but also of clustering problems as (see below
for details) the approach is based on the transformation of a panel of abnormal returns into a time series
of identically, independently distributed ranks.
In the following we describe the two nonparametric tests we implement in the latest version of our
paper.
1.3.1. Rank Tests
The nature of rank tests is easily illustrated with reference to the case k =0 , i.e. when the event window
consists uniquely of the day on which the event occurs. Let κij denote the rank of the abnormal return
e∗
ij over the estimation window j = t0 − τ, ..., t0: the highest abnormal return gets rank κij = τ +1 ,
the second rank equal to τ,e t c . ,i . e .e∗
ij ≥ e∗
il0 ⇐⇒ κij ≥ κil0 and τ +1≥ κiτ ≥ 1. In case of ties, each
member of the group of tied observations gets a rank equal to the simple average of the ranks they would
have if they were not tied. By construction, the average rank is equal to (τ +1 ) /2.κ i0 is the rank of
the event day abnormal return. Under the null hypothesis of no eﬀect of the event on the value of the
target security, we do not expect the rank of the abnormal return associated to the event day to depart
signiﬁcantly from the average rank of τ/2+1 /2, i.e. in some sense the event day should be no diﬀerent
than what one would expect ex-ante. In practice, the test statistic simply formalizes this intuition by
transforming the distribution of abnormal returns into a homoskedastic, uniform distribution across


















a ∼ N (0,1). (3)
Corrado (1989) shows that even for n between 5 and 10 this test statistic has an approximate Gaussian
distribution while classical, parametric tests are signiﬁcantly leptokurtic and display positive skewness.
For n = 10 the power properties (i.e. probability of rejection of the null of no eﬀect, when there is a
positive abnormal return at time t0) are far superior to standard tests. Campbell and Wasley (1993)
report simulation experiments in which rank tests have close to 100% power in medium-sized samples
even with n =1 0o n l y .
























a ∼ N (0,1),
i.e. the event-day rank may be simply replaced by the average rank over the event window. Campbell
and Wasley (1993) report that for k = 4 and 10, n =1 0 , and τ = 250 the rank statistics has correct
3size and its power always exceeds 50%, while classical parametric and portfolio-based tests frequently
display wrong sizes (they over-reject the null) and very poor power. These conclusions are robust to
simulations performed with perfect clustering, i.e. assuming that all assets are subject to events on the
same time period t0.
Maynes and Rumsey (1993) propose a modiﬁcation of this test — essentially based on standardized
returns which adjust for the eﬀects of thin trading, in particular to take into account the heteroskedas-
ticity produced by missing returns — that Bartholdy et al. (2005) have shown to produce good results
in terms of size and power in the presence of extreme thin trading.
1.3.2. Sign Tests
Corrado and Zivney (1992) expand the class of nonparametric tests of cumulative abnormal asset perfor-
mance to sign tests, preserving complete robustness to departures from normality as well as symmetric
distributions. These tests generally respond to the same need as rank tests: make inferences free of


















ij <m e d i a n (e∗
i)
.
This transformation is crucial as it turns a raw distribution of abnormal returns that can be asymmetric
(i.e. with non-zero median) into one such that Pr(Giτ =+ 1 )=P r ( Giτ = −1), i.e. the distribution
is perfectly symmetric around a zero median. Importantly, the resulting distribution is homoskedastic.
The intuition for the test statistic to follow is otherwise straightforward: if the event fails to have an
impact on asset values, then Gi0 s h o u l dn o tb es t a t i s t i c a l l yd i ﬀerent from its zero mean. The sign test









a ∼ N (0,1). (4)
1.3.3. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Diﬀerences in Means
Given m matched pairs of abnormal returns {eij,e lj}m
j=1 for two stocks or portfolios (indexed as i and l)
drawn from a bivariate population with means E[ei]a n dE[el] and unknown variance-covariance matrix,
then a test of the hypothesis that E[ei]=E[el] against the alternative that E[ei] <E [el]m a yb eb a s e d
on a statistic U+





ˆ κij ˆ κij ≡
(
˜ κij if zil,j > 0
0 otherwise
,
1Note that when the event window is expanded by an even number of observations, it is possible that the value of the












when τ is an even number so that G
p
i = 0 is guaranteed not to be possible (the median interpolates two actual values for




i ∼ N(0,1). Now, if the event window increases by
an even number, and half of the new values for G
p
i equal +1 and the other half −1, so that they perfectly cancel out, the
sign test statistic remains unchanged.
4where ˜ κij is the rank for the diﬀerence series {zil,j}m
j=1 and ˆ κij takes only the ranks that correspond
to the abnormal returns of i exceeding those from l. The moment generating function of U+ can be
easily characterized in recursive fashion and it implies that E[U+
il ]=1
4k(k +1 ) , while Va r[U+
il ]=
1









converges to a N(0,1). I nt h ep a p e r ,w ec o m p u t ea ne s t i m a t eo fVa r[U+
il ] by using information from the
estimation window of length τ, in line with the way in which non-parametric test statistics are generally





il,j − ¯ U+
il,j)2. Extensions to the
case in which abnormal returns concern portfolios of stocks are straightforward.
1.4. Thin Trading Issues
Since Heinkel and Kraus (1988) researchers in ﬁnance have been aware that event studies performed on
thinly traded stocks may present a number of diﬃculties. Chieﬂy, it is common for standard data sets
to treat days in which no trading occurs on a stock in a very simple way: by repeating the last realized
transaction price from the preceding day(s). This means that thinly traded stocks will be characterized
by frequent occurrences of zero (raw) returns, instances in which the realized price seems not to have
changed, while in fact no trading has occurred. On the other hand, when trading occurs, recorded
returns tend to be relatively large, in absolute value. This practice of computing returns is referred
to as “based on lumped returns”, in the sense that realized returns are simply entirely attributed to
the day in which trading actually takes place. The presence of numerous zeros in the return series
leads to underestimating the variance of returns and may bias test statistics used to judge of abnormal
performance.
In the paper, we experiment with two additional methods of return computation that have been
popular in the literature, see e.g., Maynes and Rumsey (1993). The ﬁrst method — “uniform returns”
— computes (lumped) returns between trades and then allocates the average daily return to each day
within the multi-period interval between two subsequent trades. For instance, the sequence of daily
returns −1%,0%,0%,+3% is transformed into the sequence −1%,+1%,+1%,+1%. Since this technique
still leads to some degree of smoothing of returns, the danger of underestimating the variance of returns
and of biasing the test statistics is still present. In fact, Maynes and Rumsey (1993) report that uniform
returns techniques fail to dominate standard lumping methods.
On the contrary, Maynes and Rumsey (1993) report encouraging results for another method of return
calculation, the so-called “trade-to-trade returns”. These positive ﬁndings (in terms of size and power
of the tests) have been recently conﬁrmed by Bartholdy et al. (2005), especially when non-parametric
test statistics are employed. The method proceeds in two steps. First, the series of returns {rit}T
t=1 is
(i) modiﬁed to erase all zero raw returns, generating a sub-sequence {˜ rit}
T0
t=1 (T0 is the total number of
returns which are not zero), (ii) matched with a series {miτ}
T0
τ=1 which equals one plus the number of zero
raw return which precede a trading day. For instance, the sequence of daily returns −1%,0%,0%,+3%
5is shrunk into the sequence −1%,+3%, to which the sequence 0,3 is matched since the +3% follows












τ + θiSiτ τ =1 ,...,T 0.















miτ removes the heteroskedasticity introduced by the method.
2. Construction of the Control Portfolio
To build the control portfolio, we proceed as follows. We start with the Angolan portfolio, whose excess
returns are modeled by the process Et = n−1 Pn
i=1 ei,t,nbeing the number of “Angolan” companies,
and we are interested in building a control portfolio constituted by diamond mining companies that do
not hold concessions in Angola. The objective is to ﬁnd a vector of weights w ≡ {w1, ..., wJ} to be
assigned to stocks in the control portfolio, where J is the number of companies not operating in Angola







where the superscript C stands for “Control.”
In order for the control portfolio to constitute a meaningful benchmark, we chose w so that in the pre-
event period the control portfolio matches as closely as possible three natural properties of the Angolan
portfolio: (i) the mean of abnormal returns; (ii) the variance of abnormal returns; and (iii) a market
model beta employing returns on the world market portfolio as a regressor. Speciﬁcally, we select w
to minimize the Euclidean distance between the vector v collecting the three features of our Angolan
p o r t f o l i oa n dav e c t o rV Cw collecting the same features for the control portfolio, where V C is a 3 × J
matrix that collects the same features for each of the J non-Angolan companies:
min
w (v−V Cw)0Q(v−V Cw)
s.t. w01J =1 w ≥ 0.
The constraints in the above problem require that weights are nonnegative and sum up to one; Q is a
weighting matrix that adjusts for the diﬀerent scale of the quantitative features under consideration.
6In particular, let v be deﬁned as:
v ≡ [ˆ µE ˆ σ2
E ˆ βE]0













t=1(Et − ˆ µE)(RW





t − τ−1 Pτ
t=1 RW
t )2 .
Clearly, ˆ µE and ˆ σ2
E are simply sample estimators of the mean and the variance of abnormal returns,
while ˆ βE represents the sample estimator of a market model beta employing returns on the world market
portfolio as a regressor, Et = α+ˆ β
W
E RW
t +ηt, with ηt standard white noise disturbance. Since it is clear
that means, variances and betas are measured in diﬀerent units, a natural candidate weighting matrix














This is the inverse of the (asymptotic) standard deviations of the MLE estimators of the mean, the
variance, and the market model beta, respectively. We refer to these weights as “Variance weights”.
An alternative choice, similar to Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), consists of setting Q2 to the diag-
onal matrix that allows the control portfolio to best reproduce any of the quantitative features under
consideration. In particular, we shall care of using a target portfolio that matches as accurately as


















































i.e. a matrix that collects in each of its columns the vector of daily abnormal returns for each of the J
control stocks. The notation makes it explicit that w eﬀectively depends on Q2 through the optimization
problem. The sense of this choice of the weighting matrix Q2 is that we would like the control portfolio
to give mean abnormal returns of the same magnitude as the target portfolio. We denote the resulting
w e i g h t sa s“ A - Gw e i g h t s ” .
7The pre-event sample period we used for the weighting was from January 1, 1998 to Jan. 31, 2002.
In Guidolin and La Ferrara (2004) we showed that results were very similar with the two sets of weights.
Appendix Table A1 reports the estimated weights we employ in the current version of the paper, which
are the “A-G weights”.
[Insert Appendix Table A1]
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AKD  0.010694 
ALCASTON MINING  0.029895 
BHP BILLITON  0.022666 
CONQUEST MINING  0.008826 
CROWN DIAMONDS  0.005888 
GONDWANA RESOURCES  0.021115 
GRAVITY CAPITAL  0.006645 
KIMBERLEY DIAMOND  0.017457 
MOUNT BURGESS MINING  0.009056 
OROPA  0.005141 
PLENTY RIVER CORP.  0.003275 
REEFTON MINING  0.003750 
RESOURCE MINING  0.016354 
RIMFIRE PACIFIC MINING  0.526298 
TAWANA RESOURCES  0.004851 
AFMINEX  0.005653 
CLUFF RES. PAC  0.008743 
GOLDSEARCH  0.007797 
STRIKER RESOURCES  0.005126 
ASTRO MINING  0.005616 
FORTUNE MINERALS  0.007794 
GUYANOR RES.SA (TSE)  0.007113 
PLATINOVA A/S  0.004979 
SOUTHWESTERN RES.  0.013450 
ABER DIAMOND  0.008358 
DIAMOND FIELDS INTL.  0.033868 
ETRUSCAN RESOURCES  0.008588 
REX DIAMOND MNG.  0.004758 
BAND ORE RES.NEW  0.006644 
BRAZILIAN DIAMONDS  0.008247 
CALDERA RES.  0.007287 
COMAPLEX MINERALS  0.054323 
GOLDEN STAR RESOURCES 0.013539 
MOUNTAIN PROV.DIAS.  0.012391 
PURE GOLD MRLS.  0.034170 
SUDBURY CONTACT MNS.  0.005056 
TAHERA  0.005403 
RNC Gold  0.006080 
AFRICAN GEM RES.  0.008067 
GOOD HOPE DIAMONDS  0.009157 
THABEX EXPLORATION  0.012262 
ZENITH CONCESSIONS  0.003620 
 